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Abstract: Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and 
functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons 
instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the 
commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the 
framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be 
adaptive skeletomotor action. 
 
R1. The nature of the problem and definitions of consciousness 
 
For decades, the question of what consciousness contributes to the functioning of the nervous 
system has perplexed theorists and experimentalists, leading some of the greatest scientific 
minds, including the Nobel laureates Leon Cooper, Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Eric Kandel, 
and Charles Sherrington, to conclude that answering this question is one of the greatest puzzles 
in science. As Shallice (1972) asserts, “The problem of consciousness occupies an analogous 
position for cognitive psychology as the problem of language behavior does for behaviorism, 
namely, an unsolved anomaly within the domain of the approach” (p. 383). Passive frame theory 
(PFT), a synthesis of diverse ideas, attempts to answer this question and yield novel insights 
about consciousness and the brain, all within a conceptual framework that, importantly, is 
internally coherent (Dux, Gainotti) and comprehensive (Mudrik). PFT attempts to illuminate 
what consciousness contributes to nervous function, how it serves this role, and what 
consciousness is, at least in mechanistic, functional terms. In the framework, consciousness is 
passive albeit essential. Without it, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor function. The 
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theory does not address what Marr (1982) referred to as the “implementation” level of analysis, 
that is, how neural activities instantiate these conscious states, which is an enigma for various 
disciplines, including neurobiology. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how 
PFT provides clues regarding this enigma. In addition, we emphasize how the framework is 
different from established models. 
 
Regarding the commentaries, we are grateful for their collegial, constructive, and 
thoughtful nature. We will study these commentaries for years to come. Several of them contain 
insights (e.g., tasting always requires a voluntary act [Gallo], action selection in dreams [Porte], 
and unique properties of olfaction [Merker]) that will serve as a basis for future research. Many 
commentaries also contained deep questions that can be answered only after years of further 
investigation. We were pleased that many commentators viewed PFT as a unique, novel, and 
internally coherent framework. Subsequently, we respond to the general themes raised in the 
commentaries. 
 
With our EASE (elemental, action-based, simple, and evolutionary-based) approach, we 
focused on the most basic form of consciousness (e.g., the experience of a smell, visual 
afterimage, tooth pain, or urge to scratch an itch) and contrasted it with unconscious processes 
(e.g., the pupillary reflex, peristalsis). We avoided precise definitions of the phenomenon under 
investigation because, as noted by Sir Karl Popper, definition is the final stage, and not the 
beginning, of scientific inquiry. For scientific progress, one needs only identifications and 
contrasts (e.g., nausea vs. the pupillary reflex). A useful working definition for basic 
consciousness is provided by Nagel (1974), who proposed that an organism possesses basic 
consciousness if there is something it is like to be that organism – something it is like, for 
example, to be human and experience pain, breathlessness, or yellow afterimages. Similarly, 
Block (1995) proposes, “The phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in 
that state” (p. 227). All the contents of which one is conscious compose the conscious field, 
which changes over time (Fig. 1). The size of the field changes, in a sense, when a new content, 
which could stem from polysensory configurations of afference (e.g., the McGurk effect), 





















Figure 1.  The conscious field, with a different medley of conscious contents at each moment in 
time.  Each of the three conscious fields, representing three different moments in time, 
possesses its own configuration of conscious contents (the filled shapes).  One conscious 
content (e.g., the triangle) can be a sound; another conscious content (e.g., the square) can 
be an olfactory stimulus or an action-related urge. 
 
R2. Explanatory power and novelty of passive frame theory 
 
Blackmore, Lin, Mudrik, and Prinz requested clarifications about the explanatory power of 
PFT. As a synthesis of six theoretical approaches from diverse fields of study (ideomotor theory, 
subset consensus, integration consensus, encapsulation, sensorium hypothesis, and PRISM 
[parallel responses into skeletal muscle]), PFT yields novel insights. For example, our approach 
specifies how, when these hypotheses are united, then something resembling our proposed 
“frame” architecture (in which the skeletomotor response to one conscious content is framed by 
the other contents) would be required for adaptive action. PFT also explains subjective data from 
(a) intersensory conflicts, (b) smooth muscle conflicts (Morsella et al. 2009a), (c) synchrony 
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blindness (sect. R7), and (d) skeletomotor conflicts (e.g., holding one’s breath). PFT also 
explains (e) why one is conscious of contents even when those contents are irrelevant to other 
contents or to ongoing action, and, relevant to Seth’s comment regarding the relationship 
between consciousness and effector systems, (f) why skeletal muscle is the only “voluntary” 
muscle. Regarding (f), it is important to emphasize that the conscious acts of expressing (or 
suppressing) inhaling, blinking, swallowing, and micturating all involve, specifically, skeletal 
muscle. Accordingly, regarding digestion, one is conscious only of those phases of the process 
that require coordination with skeletomotor plans (e.g., chewing or micturating) and none of 
those that do not (e.g., peristalsis). Conversely, no skeletomotor plans are involved in the actions 
of consciously impenetrable processes such as the pupillary reflex, peristalsis, and stomach 
action, all of which involve smooth muscle.1 Hence, in response to Seth, the integration achieved 
through conscious processing is intimately related, not to perceptual processing, smooth muscle 
control, or motor control, but to skeletomotor action selection. Simply put, PFT explains that 
consciousness is for voluntary action. Without conscious mediation, adaptive integration fails to 
occur, as in the case of unintegrated actions (e.g., dropping a hot dish or failing to hold one’s 
breath while underwater).  
 
 
Figure 2.  The conscious field, with a different medley of conscious contents (filled shapes) at 
each moment in time.  The conscious field during the third moment includes the percept 
“da,” induced by the intersensory, McGurk illusion.  Another conscious content could be 
a phonological representation (e.g., /haus/) triggered by seeing a word (e.g., “HOUSE”).  
The lines feeding into each conscious field represent the unconscious and often 





Many commentators mentioned that the approach is novel. Others (e.g., Blackmore, 
Hommel & Wiers) requested more information regarding its novelty. (As a synthesis, PFT 
naturally contains ideas that have been presented elsewhere.) First, unlike other approaches, PFT 
specifies which integrations require consciousness and which do not, which is a current and 
major problem (cf. Mudrik et al. 2014). Several approaches posit that the integration associated 
with consciousness is for high-level semantic processes (Mudrik et al. 2014; Thagard & Stewart 
2014), which is at odds with our more “low-level,” action-based proposal. There are also 
accounts in which consciousness is, not for intra-organismic processes, but for high-level, 
sociocultural interactions (Banks 1995; Carlson 1994; Frith 2010; Macphail 1998; Prinz 2012). 
Other high-level accounts (e.g., Clark 2002; Koch 2004) propose that conscious processes are 
functionally unique because they tax semantic memory or top-down processes or are capable of 
anticipating the future. Moreover, some have hypothesized that consciousness serves no function 
in action control (Hommel 2013; Koch 2014; Masicampo & Baumeister 2013; see also Jackson 
1986; Kinsbourne 1996; 2000; Pinker 1997).  (Here we are excluding mention of the many 
theories in which consciousness is epiphenomenal.) As is evident in the commentaries, some 
theorists (e.g., Blackmore) disagree with our basic assumptions that there is a difference 
between conscious and unconscious processing and that consciousness is associated with only a 
subset of nervous function. 
 
Second, unlike other approaches, we propose that the integration provided by 
consciousness is associated, not with perceptual processing (e.g., afference binding), efference 
binding, or smooth muscle binding, but with binding for a peculiar kind of action control. Third, 
PFT is unique in specifying that conscious contents influence only action systems and not 
content generators: Conscious contents are sampled only by action systems. As far as we know, 
PFT, building on Morsella (2005) and Merker (2013), is the only such account. PFT is also 
unique in that it focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is action based instead of 
perception based. 
 
Moreover, PFT is unique in proposing that (a) conscious contents cannot influence each 
other either at the same time or across time, which counters the everyday notion that one 
conscious thought can lead to another conscious thought; (b) one conscious content does not 
“know,” and should not know, of its relevance to ongoing action, to higher-order goals, or to 
other contents in the field; (c) though consciousness is not epiphenomenal or omnipresent (e.g., 
as in panpsychism), its role is more passive and less teleological than that of other accounts (e.g., 
Baars 1988; 2002; Dehaene 2014); (d) during a frame check, the field functions as a unitary 
entity in terms of its influence over the skeletomotor output system, an important point that 
renders moot the debate concerning whether the conscious field should be construed as a unitary 
or componential entity (cf. Searle 2000): Action-related modules in the skeletomotor output 
system must treat, in terms of functional consequences, the mosaic of contents in the field as one 
thing. Last, (e) PFT reveals that, during action selection, anticipated action effects, actual action 
effects, and information about the immediate environment must exist as comparable tokens in a 
common decision space. Although consciousness has historically been associated with the 
highest levels of processing, here it is revealed that consciousness must occur at the level of 
processing that is shared with that of representations of the immediate external environment (e.g., 
olfactory stimuli). The conscious field is concerned most not about the future or past, but about 
	 6 
the immediate present (Pahlavan & Arouss), the scenario in which overt action will unfold. 
Last-minute changes in a course of action might arise from entry of new contents (Merker 2013).   
 
Hommel & Wiers requested that we differentiate PFT from “global workspace” 
approaches. Consistent with Baars (1988; 2002; see similar models in Anderson 1983; Minsky 
1985; Selfridge 1959), PFT proposes that these states integrate nervous processes that are 
otherwise independent. However, PFT is based more on Jamesian ideomotor approaches, which 
are action based, than it is on workspace models. In the development of PFT, that which 
rendered it internally coherent was reconciling ideomotor theory with encapsulation: If one 
adopts the notions of encapsulation and of ideomotor processing, in which percepts must activate 
response codes (which also occurs in “continuous flow” [McClelland 1979] or “cascade” 
[Eriksen & Schultz 1979] models), and if one accepts that intuitions about perception and action 
(as in the case of a blackboard diagram in which sensory inputs are connected to motor outputs) 
are actually computationally impossible (Tsotsos 1995; 2011), then it becomes apparent that 
something like our proposed frame is needed for adaptive action. Unlike the workspace models 
(e.g., Baars 1988; Dehaene 2014), which propose that conscious representations are broadcast to 
modules engaged in both stimulus interpretation and content generation, in PFT (as in Merker 
2007), the contents of the conscious field are directed only at the unconscious processes of the 
skeletomotor output system (Fig. 3). The proposed architecture is consistent with the view 
(Cisek 2007; Cisek & Kalaska 2010) that, in the nervous system, actional processes cannot be 
distinguished from decision-making processes (see Hardcastle, White, Kloos, & Hardcastle 
[Hardcastle et al.]). Last, unlike in workspace approaches, in which consciousness serves more 
than a handful of functions (e.g., Baars 1988; Dehaene 2014), we propose that the conscious 
field serves only one basic, passive role. It performs this same basic function for several kinds of 
processes, including some high-level functions (e.g., in adult humans). Figuratively speaking, in 
PFT, the real work is not done in the conscious field (Gur): The conscious field is a workspace 
without the work (Lashley 1956). In contrast, according to Baars (1988), consciousness serves 
many functions, including adaptation and learning, decision making, analogy forming, editing 




















Figure 3.  At one moment in time, the conscious contents are apprehended by the unconscious, 
action mechanisms of the skeletal muscle output system.  Each mechanism (represented 
by a gray sensor) is associated with a certain kind of (unconsciously mediated) action 
(e.g., articulating vs. reaching), which is signified by the Rs (for Responses). 
 
 
R2.1. Field construction and conscious versus unconscious integrations 
 
In PFT, both the content generators and response systems are complex, unconscious processes, 
which is consistent with comments (Lin, Mudrik) about the sophistication of unconscious 
processes. It is clear that, in the construction of the conscious field, there is the participation of 
unconscious representations from both bottom-up and top-down sources, including those 
associated with frontal cortex (Bar et al. 2006; Perlovsky). As noted by Perlovsky and by 
LeDoux (1996), some of these pre-conscious representations are “vague” and poorly developed 
compared to conscious contents (Perlovsky). The mechanisms of multiple drafts (Dennett 1991), 
apperception (Wundt 1902/1904), and reentrant processing involve unconscious afference from 
top-down and bottom-up sources (Bar et al. 2006; Basso, Dux, Perlovsky, Porte). These 
processes illuminate how the contents in the conscious field could satisfy the criteria of multiple 
modules, a form of multiple-constraint satisfaction (Dennett 1991; Merker 2012) yielding the 
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“global best estimate” of what each content should be (Helmholtz 1856/1961; Merker 2012). 
Although these mechanisms explain the underpinnings of good field construction, they do not 
account for the first-person perspective or subjectivity.   
 
Related to Blackmore, Gur, Mudrik, and Lin’s comments about conscious versus 
unconscious integrations, the latter can occur for perceptual (e.g., intersensory) processing, 
smooth muscle control, motor programming, and stimulus-response reflexes. Unconscious 
integrations also occur in the perception of the flavor of food, which involves the combining of 
information from multiple modalities (including haptic, gustatory, and olfactory; Shepherd 
2006), and in pain perception, in which there is, for example, interaction between sensory 
(lateral pain system) and affective (medial pain system) components (Melzack & Casey 1968; 
Nagasako et al. 2003). Evidence reveals that, even for high-level executive processing, much of 
what transpires is actually unconscious (Dehaene 2014; Suhler & Churchland 2009), as in the 
case of determining tendencies (Ach, 1905/1951). In response to Mudrik’s comment about the 
conscious penetrability of perception, it is important to reiterate that rivalrous percepts (e.g., the 
Necker cube or binocular rivalry) or intersensory illusions (e.g., the McGurk effect) are resolved 
unconsciously: At one moment, consciousness is occupied by only one unambiguous 
interpretation of the stimulus (Merker 2012). One is conscious only of the outcome of any 
competitive processes. Hence, for an experimental subject, the McGurk effect2 “just happens” in 
much the same manner as does dream content (Lin, Porte). The only conflicts that one is 
conscious of are associated with action selection.   
 
We agree with Basso, Franz, Gur, Lin, Mudrik, Pahlavan & Arouss, and Schwartz & 
Pournaghdali that the conscious field affords a type of processing in which the behavioral 
response to a given content (e.g., a stimulus eliciting aggression or the McGurk effect) is 
modulated (or “framed”) by the other contents (e.g., smoke) composing the field (Fig. 2). 
Accordingly, as Lin notes, responding adaptively to a complex array of stimuli (e.g., a visual 
scene) requires consciousness. The conscious field permits downstream, motor-related processes 
to respond to a stimulus in a manner that is contextually sensitive. This kind of sensitivity 
appears to be unlike anything we find in the robots of today. In short, the conscious field solves 
the problem, in behaviorism, of the complex discriminative stimulus. 
 
This sensitivity has led some to conclude that the conscious field is for flexible 
responding (Basso, Franz, Gur, Lin, Mudrik, Pahlavan & Arouss, Schwartz & 
Pournaghdali). PFT is in accord with proposals in which consciousness affords what appears to 
be a flexible, multi-determined response (Crick & Koch 2000; Searle 2000; Sergent & Dehaene 
2004). However, it should be clarified that consciousness, over time, seems to be more flexible 
than it is. PFT reveals that the same contents will always yield the same voluntary action, with 
the combination of contents wholly and exclusively determining voluntary action selection. 
Consider that, if one experienced half of what is normally the whole conscious field, though 
behavior would certainly suffer, one would not notice the absence of information independent of 
a content generated by a system dedicated to detecting such discrepancies. In this way, confusion 
and other forms of metacognition are not givens. (Similarly, the perception of time and spatial 
“perspective,” whether in the first-person perspective or third-person perspective, are not givens 
[Einstein & Infeld 1938. Instead, they are mental creations that are experimentally manipulable; 
Ehrsson 2007].) These contents are generated by devoted systems that constrain action selection, 
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as Schwartz & Pournaghdali note. In the conscious field, there is often the absence of 
information but not information about absence (Bridgeman, personal communication, April, 16, 
2014; Simons & Levin 1997). Accordingly, and related to Hommel & Wiers’s insights about 
addiction, urges in the field can be short lived but have, in the absence of strong tendencies 
against them, a strong influence on behavior (Loewenstein 1996). 
 
Faced with the apparent flexibility of consciousness, one might propose that the function 
of consciousness is one of instantiating stimulus-response relationships that are “arbitrary.” One 
problem with this hypothesis is that (a) it is difficult to define what constitutes an arbitrary 
mapping between perception and action; (b) there are countless cases of unconscious processes 
that seem to involve arbitrary mappings, as in the case of motor programming (Grossberg 1999; 
Rosenbaum 2002); and (c) some non-arbitrary mappings (e.g., holding one’s breath yields a 
negative subjective state) never become unconscious, despite extensive training and rehearsing 
of the perception-to-action mappings (Poehlman et al. 2012). Moreover, unlike PFT, this 
hypothesis fails to explain why smooth muscle actions and intersensory conflicts are always 
mediated unconsciously. 
 
R3. The focus on simple cases: Low-level versus high-level conscious contents 
 
To investigate the primary function of consciousness, we were influenced by how progress was 
achieved in the field of physics (Einstein & Infeld 1938). Hence, we focused on simple cases and 
low-level phenomena (e.g., percepts and urges). Regarding urges, in our creature in the cave 
scenario, the noxious stimulus leading to an inborn avoidance tendency could have been, instead 
of smoke, some other odorant (e.g., hydrogen sulfide eliciting an inborn disposition of disgust; 
Gallo, Gur, Lathe, Mudrik). Our point was to illustrate that the inborn action tendency toward 
the smell changed the manner in which the creature responded to perceptual features of the scene 
(e.g., the opening) that were already represented in the conscious field. In response to Gur’s 
comments about the capabilities of our creature in the cave, we should emphasize that we 
interpreted as parsimoniously as possible the operations giving rise to the behavior of this 
creature, a creature that is not as hypothetical as we thought (D’Souza & Bremner). 
 
Regarding the ubiquitous distinction between high- and low-level conscious contents (de 
Vries & Ward; Dux; Franz; Gur; Hardcastle et al.; Hommel & Wiers; Jordan & Vinson; 
Melo, Koscik, Vrantsidis, Hathaway & Cunningham [Melo et al.]; Mudrik; Perlovsky; 
Swain, Caluser, Mahmood, Meldrim & Morelen [Swain et al.]; Vonasch, Masicampo, & 
Baumeister [Vonasch et al.]), one contribution of our action-based approach is that these 
distinctions are unnecessary. In PFT, all of these different kinds of contents can be construed as 
tokens which, through the conscious field, constrain voluntary action. From this standpoint, a 
percept, urge, nausea, and even a high-level sense, such as the sense of agency (which is 
experimentally manipulable [Riddle et al. 2015] and was touched upon by Gur, Massaro & 
Rowe, Mudrik, Pahlavan & Arouss, Prinz, and Schwartz & Pournaghdali), are just contents 
in the conscious field that constrain action selection. For example, while driving, a tip-of-the-
tongue state concerning important information could influence action selection (e.g., one decides 
to park in order to concentrate on retrieval; cf. Schwartz & Pournaghdali). Hence, a percept, urge, 
and even a metacognition are similar in terms of their functional consequences. From this 
standpoint, a primitive form of self is necessary, not for the instantiation of consciousness (as in 
Prinz 2012; Prinz), but rather for adaptive action selection.   
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In addition, for adaptive action, the highest of conscious contents must be married, in a 
sense, to the representational format of the lowest and phylogenetically oldest contents: High-
level contents must exist in the same decision space and share the representational format with 
contents as primitive as those of olfaction. Hence, knowledge of the most primitive systems 
involved in the conscious field will reveal much about the nature of the highest systems, such as 
those of concern to Dux and Vonasch et al. As de Vries & Ward note, the latter are constrained 
by the former, which might be the most tractable to investigate. This is consistent with 
Shepherd’s (2007) conclusion that “the basic architecture of the neural basis of consciousness in 
mammals, including primates, should be sought in the olfactory system, with adaptations for the 
other sensory pathways reflecting their relative importance in the different species” (p. 93). In 
humans, skeletomotor action conflicts often include a medley of high- and low-level contents.3 
This is evident when, faced with a yellow traffic light, one decides to begin to brake or to speed 
up (it depends on context; see Woodman & Vogel 2005, p. 111). It is also evident in Merker’s 
“burnt broccoli” example and in the following scenario: “I am hungry and desire steak, but I am 
Catholic, and it is Good Friday.” Our “Thanksgiving dinner” example was intended to 
demonstrate how a high-level function – language – must take into account contents from a 
phylogenetically older function – that is, olfaction. Consistent with Melo et al., Schwartz & 
Pournaghdali, and Merker, the high-level contents (including metacognitions and emotion) 
participate with the low-level contents in the constraining of action selection. Accordingly, 
Freeman (2004) proposes that conscious representations of different sensory origins must at 
some level be similar in form in order for them to be integrated into a polysensory gestalt of the 
world. The format must permit interaction between perceptual and motor systems (Freeman 
2004) if there is to be perception-to-action translations (Prinz 2003).  
 
In agreement with Vonasch et al., much can be learned from what has been regarded as 
high-level contents (e.g., our insights about the McGurk effect and subvocalization, Helmholtz’s 
[1856/1961] insights about automatic reading). The focus on simpler aspects of human behavior 
reflects only the presently intended scope of PFT. It is hoped that, after empirical and theoretical 
developments, the model will generalize to more complex phenomena, including aggression 
(Pahlavan & Arouss), taste (Gallo, Lathe), development (D’Souza & Bremner), emotion 
(Gainotti, Melo et al., Pahlavan & Arouss), addiction-related behaviors (Hommel & Wiers), 
dream consciousness (Porte), and parental consciousness (Swain et al.). The commentators have 
illuminated the under-explored action-related aspects of these phenomena. Emotional 
phenomena, with their action-related components (Melo et al.; Frijda 1986), provide a rich 
domain in which to develop PFT (Gallo, Gainotti, Melo et al., Pahlavan & Arouss). (As Gainotti 
notes, affective neuroscience provides additional evidence for a cortical account of 
consciousness [see also Dux].) Concerning human development (D’Souza & Bremner, Swain et 
al.), we were delighted to learn that our creature in the cave may not exist only hypothetically. 
Such insights from the commentators will help test and extend PFT. In addition, our aim is to 
eventually unify PFT, already a synthesis, with frameworks concerning ecological perception (de 
Vries & Ward), attention (e.g., the allocation of attention to action model of Franz), emotion 
(e.g., the iterative reprocessing model of Melo et al.), and chaos and complexity (Hardcastle et 
al.).  
 
Regarding the generation of high-level contents, it is important to reiterate that, when 
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discussing unconscious inference, Helmholtz (1856/1961) was referring not only to the 
unconscious generation of low-level contents, but also to the generation of high-level contents 
(e.g., automatic word reading; Augustinova & Ferrand 2014). In many cases, high-level contents 
(e.g., subvocalizations) “just happen” as do low-level contents (e.g., nausea; Porte; see also 
reflex-like activations of high-level contents in Haidt [2001] and Tetlock [2002]). To investigate 
how such high-level contents can arise in consciousness unintentionally and in a reflex-like 
manner, we developed the reflexive imagery task (RIT; Allen et al. 2013). In this paradigm, the 
insuppressible conscious contents are from high-level processes, including involuntary object 
counting (Merrick et al. 2015), subvocalizations, and even the kind of word transformations in 
the childhood game of Pig Latin (Cho et al. 2015). The more we learn from the RIT about the 
generation of high-level contents, the more this generative process resembles that of low-level 
contents. 
 
From the standpoint of PFT and in response to Massaro & Rowe, Mudrik, Perlovsky, 
Schwartz & Pournaghdali, and Seth, the outputs from a “narratorium” or an “interpreter” 
module that draws coherent (albeit often incorrect) conclusions about the current context (Roser 
& Gazzaniga 2004) are just another kind of content, produced by dedicated systems that 
participate in the conscious field. Consciousness, which is passive, does not reason or draw 
conclusions. Instead, systems devoted to reasoning or to drawing certain kinds of conclusions 
(e.g., about a puzzle or a piece of music) have their outputs represented in the conscious field, 
just as a modular system can maintain an undesired “earworm” in consciousness. 
 
PFT provides a similar answer regarding memory. We agree that many memorial 
processes are consciously impenetrable (Schwartz & Pournaghdali) and that the activities of 
content generators are influenced by past experiences. Memory is essential for the adaptive 
generation of, and response to, contents (Basso, D’Souza & Bremner, Gur, Hardcastle et al., 
Hommel & Wiers, Jordan & Vinson, and Lathe). However, these processes stem from 
dedicated systems operating outside the conscious field, which itself has no memory. (This is 
evident in neurological conditions.) Similarly, anticipatory processing (Jordan & Vinson, Seth), 
which is essential for perception and other forms of content generation, occurs outside the 
conscious field, which is not burdened with the operations of memory, prospection, or 
deliberation (Hardcastle et al.).  (Relevant to the experimental findings by Hardcastle et al., 
which involved dissociations between perception and action, expressed actions could sometimes 
influence not perception, but only the memory of the expressed action [Cooper et al. 2012].) 
 
R3.1. Metacognition and consciousness across the phyla 
 
Compared to all the functions that have been proposed to be the primary function of conscious 
processing, the proposed function of consciousness in PFT is the most basic and primitive one. 
In response to Rosenbaum’s point about animal consciousness, PFT, when further developed, 
might serve as a tractable framework with which to investigate consciousness in animals. 
However, at this stage of understanding, it is premature to apply our framework to other animals. 
Across the phyla, it is the case that the same function (e.g., locating an object) can be carried out 
by vastly different mechanisms (e.g., vision vs. echolocation). Hence, one cannot conclude that a 
given action (e.g., holding of breath) in species X is carried out by the same mechanisms by 
which it is carried out in species Y. Even within one species, the same function could be carried 
out by more than one mechanism (Dawkins 1982). Hence, before making cross-species 
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comparisons, which are problematic, science must explain the perplexing contrasts within self-
reporting, adult humans.  (This conclusion is relevant also to idea of extending PFT to infants; 
D’Souza & Bremner.) At present, in humans alone there are sufficient contrasts (e.g., the 
pupillary reflex vs. conscious pain) that are difficult to explain.  (In addition, as Swain et al. note, 
the most basic of human functions – as simple and primitive as they have been deemed to be – 
nonetheless seem to occupy much of the brain’s activity and to dominate much of human 
existence, especially during the most critical of periods [e.g., early childhood, parenting].)  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth reiterating that, because our approach is simplistic and 
evolutionary based, it may be the most suitable framework to be extended to the study of other 
animals. Insofar as one would like to study consciousness across species, one should focus on 
olfaction, for several reasons, including that it is the most phylogenetically preserved modality 
and a “common denominator” region of the vertebrate brain. Moreover, when conducting 
experiments on adult humans, it is much easier to induce olfactory percepts than high-level, 
metacognitive states and background states, such as those mentioned by Basso, de Vries & 
Ward, Franz, Perlovsky, and Schwartz & Pournaghdali. For example, regarding tip-of-the-
tongue states and feelings of knowing, it is difficult to control exactly when these states arise, 
and little is known about their neural correlates. At this stage of understanding, it is progressive 
to focus on obvious, easily reportable forms of conscious content (e.g., detecting a smell) and not 
on more nebulous conscious states (e.g., background states). The lack of verbal report regarding 
the stimulation of frontal areas may indeed reflect the greater difficulty of communicating about 
these contents than about perceptual events. Hence, in the current version of PFT, we limit 
ourselves to the kinds of conscious contents occurring in our creature in the cave scenario. 
Nevertheless, these high-level states, which involve the frontal cortex, may provide unique 
insights regarding consciousness. 
 
Franz questioned whether olfaction is a model system for consciousness research. 
Justifications for our focus on olfaction can be found in the target article (Note 1 and sect. 3.5). 
We are grateful for Merker’s listing of additional properties of olfaction (e.g., minimal 
spatialization, habituability of ordinary odorants, innate preferences, pheromonal signaling) that 
render it a good modality for investigating consciousness. As Gallo notes, other unique 
properties of olfaction are that there is no such thing as a “neutral” odorant and that swallowing 
is almost always a voluntary act. Concerning habituation (Merker), this phenomenon occurs in a 
special manner for olfaction because of the absence of the possibility of voluntary re-access to an 
exposed odorant (Merker; Stevenson 2009). Regarding the “experiential nothingness” associated 
with habituation, research indicates that (a) activation in the orbitofrontal cortex does not 
decrease over odorant exposure (60 seconds; Poellinger et al. 2001), and (b) accurate odor 
detection persists after activation in the piriform cortex decreases to a baseline (or below 
baseline) level (Poellinger et al. 2001; Sobel et al. 2000). When isolating the neural correlates of 
olfactory consciousness, one should seek regions that are active most during conscious detection 
but not during habituation or subliminal perception (Merrick et al. 2014). Merker’s forward-
looking insights also reveal that much can be learned about olfactory consciousness by 
examining the activities of cortical layer VI pyramidal cells and the effects on olfactory 
consciousness from perturbations (e.g., lesions) of the dorsal pulvinar, a multimodal region 
whose activity is tightly linked with conscious perception (Wilke et al. 2009).  
 
R4. Passive frame theory explains the primary function of consciousness 
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Prinz astutely questions whether PFT provides a functional account of consciousness.  (Prinz 
also requested a definition of subjective experience that is distinct from our functional account of 
consciousness. This definition is provided in sect. R1.) We agree that a constellation of isolated 
facts (e.g., that skeletal muscle but not smooth muscle can be consciously controlled) does not 
constitute by itself an explanatory model, just as one can know that the sun rises every morning 
and that the seasons change without having an explanatory model of the solar system. Hence, it is 
one thing to know that skeletal muscle can be consciously controlled, but it is an entirely 
different matter to have an explanatory framework that integrates such a fact into a coherent, 
causal account. PFT provides such a framework. 
 
Perhaps this issue is better illustrated by analogy. In naively observing the digestive 
system, one could generate hypotheses concerning the circumstances under which, say, salivary 
amylase is secreted into the mouth. However, these hypotheses would be fundamentally different 
from those regarding the primary function of salivary amylase, which would have to propose, in 
addition, what it is for (e.g., digestion of starch in the mouth) and, by extension, what phenomena 
would occur to a lesser degree without it. As a theory about function, PFT supersedes these 
criteria by claiming that (a) consciousness is necessary for collective influence over the 
skeletomotor output system, (b) no other process performs this role, and, (c) without these states, 
collective influence and integrated actions would be absent. Except for the fact that the actions of 
salivary amylase upon starch can be observed directly (e.g., in a Petri dish), the functional claims 
about this enzyme and consciousness are analogous.  
 
Then, of course, there are questions regarding how salivary amylase breaks down starches 
and why salivary amylase, and not some other substance, was selected in evolution to carry out 
this function. With respect to biological systems, how and why questions are fundamentally 
different from what for questions (Lorenz 1963; Simpson 1949). PFT explains what 
consciousness is for, that is, the nature of its primary function. How physical processes carry out 
collective influence is a variant of the “hard problem” and is hence outside the scope of PFT. In 
addition, one must distinguish the primary role of evolutionary adaptations from their secondary 
roles (Dawkins 1982; Gould 1977; Lorenz 1963). A scientist could argue, for example, that color 
perception evolved for selecting fruits and detecting camouflaged prey, but no one doubts that 
color perception could also be used to appreciate a painting. The color harmony of a painting is 
perceptible to us because it involves the kinds of stimuli that are of adaptive significance in other 
contexts. In response to Prinz, we perceive the kinds of things that we evolved to act upon 
(Dawkins 1982; LeDoux 2012). As humans, we have inherited the conscious field. Like the eye, 
it has a fixed architecture, one that, though having a net adaptive effect across all the stages of 
ontogeny, may not function adaptively in all contexts. Its adaptive value may not be evident in 
one particular situation (e.g., when experiencing unhealthy urges).  
 
R4.1. The conscious field does not require conflict or skeletal muscle 
 
In response to comments about the liaison between conflict and consciousness (D’Souza & 
Bremner, de Vries & Ward, Gur, Hardcastle et al., Hommel & Wiers, Lathe, and Massaro 
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& Rowe), in PFT, a content does not require conflict to enter the conscious field, which is a 
“continuous feed” system. The conscious field is not for conflict monitoring per se, but rather for 
collective influence, which is especially important under conditions of conflict. (We agree with 
Jordan & Vinson that people underestimate how many action conflicts occur on a given day.) In 
PFT, contents, because of the requirement of encapsulation, do not know about the nature of 
other contents nor about whether there is conflict. In addition, the contents do not know whether 
they are relevant for ongoing action. The notion that no conscious content can directly influence 
another conscious content, either at the same time or across time, is consistent with gestalt theory 
(e.g., Werner and Kaplan’s [1963] notion of dynamic schematization) and with Helmholtz’s 
(1856/1961) “global perception,” in which unconscious configurations of afference interact to 
generate an unambiguous conscious field, which can be construed as a static mosaic of conscious 
contents. As Merker (2013) notes, the kinds of sensorial interactions involved in illusions (the 
McGurk effect), color constancy phenomena, and other perceptual phenomena occur not in the 
conscious field, but in the (unconscious) processing of afference, occurring before the 
construction of the conscious field. For example, though a content such as the McGurk effect is 
influenced by different kinds of configurations of afference, once the content is conscious, it 
cannot be modified on the basis of other contents. In PFT, the contents are not there to 
communicate with each other. 
 
Concerning Rosenbaum’s question about animals lacking skeletal muscle, in PFT, there 
is nothing intrinsically special about skeletal muscle that causes it to be related to consciousness. 
Skeletal muscle is one of many “multi-determined” effectors in the body.  (Consider that the 
pupillary reflex, involving smooth muscle, too, is multi-determined, as it is influenced by light 
conditions, emotions, and other variables.) Conscious processes are distinguished from 
unconscious ones not simply because they “involve” skeletal muscle, but because they involve 
skeletal muscle in a particular manner, in which encapsulated systems (having different 
operating principles and phylogenetic origins) vie to express their respective skeletomotor plans. 
 
Pertinent to Rosenbaum’s question, one can also ask, If conscious states are primarily 
for skeletomotor action, then why do they persist even when the skeletomotor system is 
deactivated because of, for example, neural damage? In response to this criticism, one should 
consider the following analogy. Many of today’s automobiles contain navigational systems 
whose primary function is to aid navigation. With this in mind, it is conceivable that the 
navigational system would continue to function despite problems with, say, the transmission of 
the car. Similarly, conscious processes, whose primary function is serving skeletomotor action, 
can continue to function after the peripheral structures that they are intended to serve are 
nonoperational.  (Similar decoupling of central conscious processing from peripheral events 
occurs in phantom limb [Ramachandran 1999].)  
 
R5. Attention, automaticity, and the timescale of consciousness 
 
In response to the concerns of Basso, Dux, Lin, and Franz about the relationship between 
attention and consciousness (see differing about this relationship in Koch and Tsuchiya [2007] 
and Cohen et al. [2012]), we posit that the nature of this relationship depends in large part on 
one’s definition of attention. As noted by Tsotsos (2011), there are more than a handful of 
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definitions of attention. Most theorists construe attention as a cause, something that influences 
information processing in a certain way, whereas other theorists, interestingly, construe it as an 
effect, for example, as a by-product of a value-based selection process centered on the basal 
ganglia (Krauzlis et al. 2014). In addition, for Oberauer and Hein (2012), there is a low-level 
form of attention, having certain properties, and a separate, higher-level form of attention, having 
other properties. It could be argued that one of these forms of attention, but not the other, is 
somehow necessary for basic consciousness. From our standpoint, it has to be explained how 
attention, defined one way or another, is necessary for the detection of basic conscious contents 
such as nausea or a gas leak (see related Merker comment about olfactory attention).  
 
We next turn to the topic of automaticity, which was raised by Gur, Massaro & Rowe, 
and Rosenbaum. Regarding the contrast between novel actions (e.g., the first time one ties one 
shoes) and automatized actions (e.g., the ten thousandth time one ties one’s shoes), it is difficult 
to ascertain which aspects of consciousness, if any, are diminished in the latter. In making such a 
contrast, one could easily conflate changes in consciousness and the well-known changes in 
attentional processes that stem from automaticity (Baars 1997; Logan et al. 1999; Puttemans et al. 
2005). The question is, What would be no longer consciously accessible when driving home 
automatically? One benefit of PFT is that when contrasting conscious and unconscious processes, 
the contrast is between processes of which one is never conscious (e.g., the pupillary reflex and 
peristalsis) and processes of which one is almost always conscious (e.g., pain and air hunger 
while holding one’s breath).   
 
In response to Hommel & Wiers’s thoughtful question about the timescale at which 
consciousness operates (related to Massaro & Rowe), we should state that according to PFT, the 
timescale must be that associated with normal, ongoing voluntary action selection, which is 
different for different kinds of voluntary acts (e.g., taking a deep breath vs. looking left to right) 
and is often slower than that of reflexive actions. Whatever the exact timescale in humans (or in 
other species; de Vries & Ward), it must be slow enough for the frame check to include the 
relevant contents for the adaptive employment of a given effector and quick enough (on the order 
of hundreds of milliseconds) to benefit actions occurring at fast rates (e.g., voluntary saccades). 
Regarding the former, it is interesting to consider that the instruction to a subject to press a 
button whenever there is a noticeable change in any part of the sensorium requires the action 
processes associated with that effector to, in a sense, sample a wide variety of contents in a very 
short time. 
 
R6. Evolution, functionalism, and emotion 
 
Prinz and others (Massaro & Rowe, Mudrik) question why the function attributed to 
consciousness is not solved unconsciously, as are many other functions. After all, it is easy to 
imagine integrated actions (e.g., suppressing inhalation) occurring without anything like a 
conscious field. However, there are many hypothetical solutions to phylogenetic challenges that 
the human body did not arrive at by way of evolution. In our descriptive account, intuitions 
regarding how the nervous system should work take a back seat to actual data revealing the 
manner in which it actually works. Hence, it seems premature to adopt an epiphenomenal stance 
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(e.g., Blackmore) until there is a sufficient scientific understanding about the place of 
consciousness in nature. We should add two comments. First, our intuitions of how nervous 
systems should function, in which sensory inputs are connected to motor outputs, are actually 
computationally impossible (Tsotsos 1995; 2011).  (Regarding this issue, Neal Miller [1959] 
hypothesized that “central states” could provide a solution to the problem [see discussion in Corr 
& Morsella 2015].) Second, some of the counterintuitive adaptations in evolutionary history (e.g., 
intra-psychic conflict) are actually good solutions given the hardware at hand (e.g., slow 
processing units; Livnat & Pippenger 2006).  
 
One could also ask, If consciousness is for action selection, then why is one aware of so 
many things that do not demand immediate action (e.g., the plot of a story; Basso, de Vries & 
Ward, Gur, Perlovsky, Porte)? One could certainly imagine more efficient systems – and more 
falsifiable models – that invoke the conscious field only under conditions when it is needed most 
(e.g., conflicting action tendencies). The apparent inefficiency of the field is an incontrovertible, 
first-person property of these states. In the absence of any conflict or obvious demands upon 
action, one is continuously conscious of, say, a red object standing before one. This 
counterintuitive property of the field can be likened to the efficiency of the continuously running 
conveyor belt of the ball-return machine at a bowling alley (Morsella 2005), which is inefficient 
in the sense that it constantly expends energy, even when there are no bowling balls needing to 
be returned to players. However, the machine is more efficient than a machine having an 
additional mechanism that determines whether a ball needs to be returned. Such deceptively 
“inefficient” solutions can be observed in physiology outside the nervous system, as in biological 
filters (e.g., the kidneys), which continuously filter a substrate regardless of the status of the 
substrate. Just as eyes do not turn off when there is nothing interesting to look at, the conscious 
field does not turn off when its role is unneeded. 
 
Regarding one’s consciousness of a story that may never influence behavior, it should be 
stated that simulacra such as novels have been constructed to incite attentional, emotional, and 
other kinds of processes for only an infinitesimally recent fraction of human history. Consistent 
with PFT, the stimuli from simulacra succeed in part because they activate inflexible, 
encapsulated systems that, at some level, are incapable of “knowing” that what is occurring is 
not “real.”  (Consistent with this view is the idea that emotional systems [e.g., for fear and 
aggression] evolved independently and are modularized in the brain [LeDoux 2000; 2012; 
Öhman & Mineka 2001].) Scary movies, for example, are capable of activating to some degree 
the kinds of affect associated with the natural observations of the portrayed events. For the 
majority of our natural history, such activation was clearly adaptive. Though such inclinations 
and imagery operate in a realm shielded from that of expressed action, they are still intimately 
related to action.  (Relevant to Porte, in certain neurological conditions, sleep paralysis fails and 
patients act out their dreams, revealing the intimate link between conscious content and action. 
Sleep paralysis is mediated by inhibition only at the latest stages of motor control [e.g., at the 
spinal level; Glenn & Dement 1981].) Thorndike (1905) concludes, “The function of thoughts 
and feelings is to influence actions . . . Thought aims at knowledge, but with the final aim of 
using the knowledge to guide action” (p. 111). 
 
Prinz asks how the design of consciousness, a product of evolution, reflects the needs of 
adaptive action control. First, we subscribe to the uncommon position that consciousness is best 
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understood by examining the requirements of adaptive efferent action control rather than the 
needs of perceptual analysis.4 Accordingly, as noted by Merker (2013), the conscious field is 
organized egocentrically (see Prinz 2007), around an active agent that reaches, locomotes, and 
performs other acts that are spatially directed. This organization is found also in the dream world 
(Porte).  (PFT pertains to normal waking consciousness, but as noted by Porte, the kind of action 
selection occurring in dreams seems isomorphic to that of waking.) For action selection, it would 
be disadvantageous for this first-person arrangement to break down and for an object on the left 
to be represented as if on the right. According to PFT, the first-person perspective and other 
properties of the field (e.g., its having varied elements) result from the demands of adaptive 
action selection. Second, the valence and other properties of a conscious content are in some 
ways isomorphic to ongoing action. It is not the case, for example, that pleasant states are 
associated with avoidant behaviors or that unpleasant ones are associated with approach 
behaviors.  (As noted by James [1890], this non-arbitrary relationship between valence and 
action poses a problem for epiphenomenalism.) Similarly, as Sperry (1952) notes, and consistent 
with de Vries & Ward’s discussion of affordances, perceptual contents (e.g., the shape of a 
triangle) are often more isomorphic with action plans (e.g., tracing) than with sensory inputs (the 
proximal stimulus on the retina). In conclusion, much of the way the field is designed, including 
a primitive sense of self (the first-person perspective), reflects the demands of adaptive action 
selection. 
 
R7. Integrated (“voluntary”) action and subliminal stimuli 
 
The evidence for PFT is the combined evidence for each of the hypotheses composing the 
framework. For such a synthesis, which attempts to account for so many disparate observations, 
there will naturally be both evidence for and against each of its constituent hypotheses. For 
example, there are bits of empirical evidence that, at first glance, appear to challenge the 
hypotheses of encapsulation and ideomotor processing and that consciousness is dependent on 
cortical processes. In the coming years, the evidence for and against the tenets composing PFT 
should be examined carefully. Some of the tenets of PFT will be amended; others will be 
abandoned.  
 
Nevertheless, today there is substantially more evidence in favor of PFT than there is 
against it. Moreover, much of the evidence supporting PFT can be obtained not just in the 
laboratory, but in everyday scenarios (e.g., the unawareness of peristalsis and the pupillary reflex 
vs. the subjective experience of holding one’s breath). These bits of evidence, realized in 
everyday life scenarios and not dependent on the technicalities of the laboratory, are often the 
most compelling forms of evidence. PFT focuses on modal findings (i.e., the most common 
findings) regarding when conflicts are conscious and when they are not. At this stage of the 
scientific understanding of a problem as thorny as consciousness in the brain, the mode is very 
informative.  
 
Ayars mentions the well-known finding in which a prime (e.g., a rightward arrow) is 
presented subliminally before a target stimulus (e.g., a leftward arrow) to which the subject must 
respond. In this paradigm, the response to the target is modulated by the prior presentation of the 
prime. For example, interference (e.g., increased response latencies) is less when the two arrows 
match (the congruent condition) than when they mismatch (the incongruent condition; Eimer & 
Schlaghecken 2003; Schlaghecken et al. 2006). Similarly, the subliminal presentation of the 
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image of a spider could, in principle, ramp down an appetitive, behavioral “approach” system. 
The data mentioned by Ayars are corroborated and complemented by many similar findings (e.g., 
Hughes et al. 2009; Van Opstal et al. 2010), some of which stem from our own laboratory, in 
which subliminal stimuli induced behavioral inclinations that induced subjective urges and also 
influenced behavior, even though subjects were unaware of the source of these urges (discussed 
subsequently and in Morsella et al. 2011). Accordingly, Desender et al. (2014), after reviewing 
the literature on subliminally induced inhibition in interference paradigms, conclude, “The 
difference between awareness of a prime and experience of a conflict is of crucial importance … 
Response conflict might give participants the general feeling that something is wrong, without 
their knowing why or what is wrong” (p. 681). To Desender et al. (2014), this subjective 
experience of conflict, regardless of awareness of the prime, is essential for the top-down control 
of behavior. 
 
The effect described by Ayars could arise from various mechanisms (Logan et al. 2015; 
Munakata et al. 2011), including negative priming (Tipper 1985) or the residual effects from the 
prime having activated, through unconscious efference binding, a response code (consistent with 
sect. 3.2 of the target article) that does not match the subsequently activated response code.  (In 
sect. 3.2, we also discuss the relevant fact that motor programs, which are unconscious, are 
modulated in sophisticated ways by external stimuli.) We agree that past experience can 
influence the activities of content generators and response systems (discussed subsequently). For 
example, a response code is likely to function more quickly when it was activated recently 
(repetition priming) than when it was not activated recently. 
 
Second, and more important, we should clarify that collective influence from a frame 
check pertains to a class of phenomena (e.g., holding one’s breath while underwater or 
suppressing some other, prepotent and simultaneously activated action plan) that is 
fundamentally different from the kind of established, sequential priming effect described by 
Ayars, in which a prime modulates (but does not fully suppress) a subsequent behavior. As 
noted by Morsella and Bargh (2011, p. 341):  	
The level of activation of the plans involved in integrated action is far beyond 
that of “sub-threshold” activations. For example, in psycholinguistic research, 
there is substantial evidence that naming “dog” primes the action plan for 
naming a member of the same category (e.g., “horse”; Levelt, 1989). The level 
of activation that we are speaking of in our definition of integrated action is far 
above this threshold—it is at the level of activation at which action plans 
would not only influence overt action but trigger action. 	
They also state that “integrated action occurs when two (or more) action plans that could 
normally influence behavior on their own (when existing at that level of activation) are 
simultaneously co-activated and trying to influence the same skeletal muscle effector” (Morsella 
& Bargh 2011, p. 341). These actions occur when one holds one’s breath, refrains from dropping 
a hot dish, suppresses the urge to scratch an itch, or makes oneself breathe faster for some reward 
(Morsella 2005; Morsella et al. 2009a). These are discrete, goal-directed actions (e.g., carrying 
an object, depressing a lever), behaviors Skinner (1953) characterized as operants (pp. 14–15). 
Based on ideomotor theory (e.g., Harleß 1861; James 1890), PFT proposes that the conscious 
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contents associated with behavioral control are action outcomes in the world (e.g., a button 
depressed) or the body (e.g., fingers snapping). This addresses the second question by 
Rosenbaum. 
 
Before returning to the experimental effect mentioned by Ayars, we should add that, 
through collective influence, the field permits for a massive many-to-one (or, at least, many-to-
few) conversion (Merker 2013), for there are many action-related contents but only a few 
operants that, at one time, direct behavior. This may reflect the mechanical limitations of the 
skeletomotor system, in which only one word can be uttered at a time (Wundt 1900), or, more 
precisely, in which only one (or a few) operant can be expressed at one time. As noted by 
Rosenbaum, this aspect of PFT should eventually be integrated with research on the 
psychological refractory period (Pashler 1993; Welford 1952), which, though not directly 
concerning conscious processing, yields conclusions that are consonant with PFT. Pashler (1993, 
p. 52) concludes: 	
The limitations in carrying out stimulus-response tasks concurrently are not 
introduced at the level of stimulus perception, nor in production of the motor 
response. Those mental operations can work in parallel. Rather, the problem is 
in deciding what the response will be, and this kind of mental operation seems 
to be carried out in series—that is, one task at a time. 	
One of our aims is to first integrate PFT with this important research (along with research on the 
role of action control on attention; e.g., Allport 1989; Neumann 1987) and then isolate, within 
the architecture of PFT, the locus of the action selection bottleneck. For now, PFT is consistent 
with Jackendoff’s (1990) view that consciousness reflects some form of intermediate, action-
planning stage in between sensory and motor processing. More specifically, we propose that 
consciousness is associated with stages that, though clearly subsequent to those of sensory 
processing (Hochberg 1998; Logothetis & Schall 1989; Marcel 1993), precede those of action 
selection. It seems that one is unaware of the computational products of action conflicts, 
resolutions that, should they exist (see Kaufman et al. 2015), determine the general course of 
observed action (pressing one button instead of another). Consciousness reflects action options, 
both those that are selected and unselected.    
 
The co-activation of action plans in integrated action can be indexed by behavioral and 
neural measures, as there are several behavioral and neural features that could be used to 
distinguish integrated from unintegrated action. For example, like any behavior of low strength, 
conflicted action (a form of integrated action) is easier to perturb than un-conflicted or 
unintegrated action (Skinner 1953). Unlike the conscious field, overt behavior is “integrated” in 
the sense that only one discrete operant is manifest (Lin), even though behavior is influenced by 
two action plans, as in the case of the Stroop incongruent condition. Unlike in the experimental 
effect described by Ayars, collective influence permits for one operant to be expressed, leading 
to only one effect in the world (e.g., a button pressed), while another operant is (almost) fully 
suppressed, leading to no noticeable effects in the world.5 Interestingly, the suppressed operant in 
a conflict could be the prepotent plan, as in the case of holding one’s breath.  (Investigators have 
begun to examine the behavioral consequences of such unselected plans [Filevich & Haggard 
2013].) With this in mind, we can respond to Jordan & Vinson’s insightful point challenging 
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the distinction between perception and action. First, in natural selection, it is overt behavior and 
not musings and mentations that are directly selected. The latter, along with mental simulations, 
are, in a sense, less costly than is overt behavior.  Importantly, behavioral inclinations can often 
be behaviorally suppressed but not mentally suppressed (Bargh & Morsella 2008). Second, the 
distinction between perception and action is an informative one because motor control, unlike 
perception, is largely unconsciously mediated. This is one of many differences between 
perception and action. 
 
Relevant to the critiques by Blackmore, Lin, Mudrik, and Prinz about the explanatory 
power of PFT, the framework reveals that, unlike involuntary actions (e.g., dropping a hot dish 
because of the pain-withdrawal reflex), voluntary actions can be construed as a form of 
integrated action. Hence, PFT defines voluntary action in ways more informative than the 
common “homuncular” definition of these acts – that an action is voluntary if the organism 
intended to do it. As noted by Passingham (1995), voluntary actions are special in that they can 
be suppressed; from the present standpoint, the act of suppression (suppressing a cough) is an 
archetypal integrated action. Again, this act is different from many forms of inhibition in the 
nervous system, many of which are unconscious, as in the case of lateral inhibition and negative 
priming.  (Relevant to Ayars, PFT does not state that inhibition requires consciousness.) One 
might then argue that, instead of proposing a framework such as PFT, it is more parsimonious to 
hypothesize that the role of consciousness is to suppress actions, for holding one’s breath or 
performing response interference tasks (e.g., the Stroop task) involves response suppression. 
However, this fails to account for the role of consciousness in integrated actions such as 
breathing faster for some reward, which requires collective influence but no suppression.  
 
Regarding subliminal stimuli, we agree that these controversial stimuli can influence 
subsequent behavior in one way or another (see review in Morsella & Bargh 2011).  (Consistent 
with the conclusions of Lin, some have argued that subjects do perceive these stimuli but that, 
for some reason [e.g., confabulation or distortions of memory], subjects fail to report about the 
conscious percept [Block 2007].) Moreover, unlike many, we do believe that these controversial 
stimuli can be regarded as unconscious. Interestingly, in some cases, the subject can be 
unconscious of the stimulus but be aware of the skeletomotor urges engendered by them 
(Morsella et al. 2011), which is consistent with the idea that one can be aware of skeletomotor 
inclinations (e.g., urges) but be unaware of the sources of these inclinations, as in many of the 
cases mentioned by Lathe and Seth and as found in research from our laboratory (Morsella et al. 
2011) and in the classic research by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), in which participants were 
unaware of the factors influencing their decisions (e.g., to aid a stranger). Hence, people can be 
conscious of tendencies (e.g., urges and cravings), but not necessarily of the factors engendering 
the tendencies (Baker et al. 2004; Nisbett & Wilson 1977). For example, the subjects in Nisbett 
and Wilson’s experiments were certainly aware of their “urge” to, say, help a stranger who had 
collapsed. If the subjects had been physically unable to aid the stranger because the stranger was 
in a precarious environment, then subjects would have certainly reported that, though they 
suppressed helping behavior, they nonetheless experienced the urge to help. This inclination 
would be conscious even though the factors giving rise to it would be unconscious. PFT predicts 
that the operating principles within content generators (e.g., for urges) can be opaque to 
awareness, as in the unconscious factors that engender addiction-related urges (Baker et al. 
2004). Accordingly, research has shown that people can have inexplicable “gut feelings” (or 
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“somatic markers”; cf. Damasio et al. 1991) reflecting the response tendencies of systems whose 
inner workings and learning histories are opaque to awareness (LeDoux 2000; Öhman & Mineka 
2001; Olsson & Phelps 2004). In short, the source of a response tendency is distinct from the 
awareness of that inclination. 
 
Hence, in the kind of experiment mentioned by Ayars, subjects might be unaware of the 
stimuli but be aware of the skeletomotor urges triggered by such stimuli.  (Desender et al. [2014] 
conclude that such awareness is required to counteract the interference effects from response 
conflict induced by subliminal or supraliminal stimuli.) We have found such effects with 
subliminal stimuli (discussed in Morsella et al. 2011) but have found it challenging to prove 
unequivocally that the stimuli were unconscious (cf. Lin). In the kind of experiment described by 
Ayars, one must examine not only whether subjects are unaware of the stimuli and, should they 
exist, the stimulus-elicited urges, but also that the contrast between the two conditions is not 
driven solely by a facilitatory effect from the congruent condition. 
 
We should add that subliminal stimuli are problematic also because they are stimuli of 
very weak strength, unlike the kind of stimuli on which unconscious processes usually operate 
(Bargh & Morsella 2008). Hence, in several studies (e.g., Molapour et al. 2011; Morsella et al. 
2009a; 2009b), we induced action-related urges by the presentation of supraliminal distractor 
stimuli in paradigms such as the Stroop and flanker tasks. Consistent with Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977), it is unclear whether subjects were aware of the source of these urges (see discussion in 
Morsella et al. 2009b). For example, though the urges arising from different flanker conditions 
were systematic (Morsella et al. 2009b), it seemed that subjects were unaware of why urges 
differed across conditions. To further investigate how action-related conscious contents can be 
triggered systematically and unintentionally by supraliminal stimuli, we developed the 
aforementioned RIT. With this paradigm, one can examine how unconscious processes operate 
over supraliminal stimuli. According to the traditions of Freud and Helmholtz, this is the usual 
way in which unconscious processes operate.  
 
The conclusions on which PFT is based do not stem from controversial techniques such 
as visual masking (see Lin). Again, much of the evidence supporting PFT can be obtained in 
everyday scenarios. Regarding laboratory data, of the many conditions in interference paradigms, 
the strongest perturbations in consciousness (e.g., urges to err) are found in conditions involving 
the activation of incompatible skeletomotor plans (Morsella et al. 2009a; 2009b), such as in the 
incongruent Stroop condition or the response interference (vs. perceptual interference) condition 
of the flanker task (see quantitative review of evidence in Morsella et al. [2011]). Conversely, 
when distinct processes lead to harmonious action plans, as when a congruent Stroop stimulus 
activates harmonious word-reading and color-naming plans (e.g., BLUE in blue font), there are 
little such perturbations in consciousness, and participants may even be unaware that more than 
one plan influenced overt action (e.g., uttering “blue”). This phenomenon, called synchrony 
blindness (Molapour et al. 2011), is perhaps more striking in the congruent (“pro-saccade”) 
condition of the anti-saccade task (Hallett 1978), in which distinct brain regions/processes 
indicate that the eyes should move in the same direction (cf. Morsella et al. 2012). Regarding the 
Stroop congruent condition, MacLeod and MacDonald (2000), after carefully reviewing the 
behavioral and psychophysiological data, conclude, “The experimenter (perhaps the participant 
as well) cannot discriminate which dimension gave rise to the response on a given congruent trial” 
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(p. 386). Last, as mentioned in Note 8 of the target article, experiments have revealed that, in 
simpler tasks, incompatible skeletomotor intentions (e.g., to point right and left) do produce 
systematic intrusions into consciousness, but, as predicted by PFT, no such changes accompany 
smooth muscle conflicts or conflicts occurring at perceptual stages of processing (e.g., 
intersensory processing; Morsella et al. 2011).  
 
We are in agreement with Bridgeman that there are many perceptual events that are 
unconscious, as in the case of backward masking, saccadic suppression, change blindness, and 
changes in self-generated action that are below the just noticeable difference for proprioception 
(Jeannerod 2006).  (The eye, discussed by Bridgeman, is interesting because it includes all the 
kinds of actions contrasted in PFT: smooth muscle action [for pupillary reflex], involuntary 
skeletomotor action [e.g., a blink], and voluntary skeletomotor action [e.g., a wink].) PFT 
proposes not that all perceptual processes are conscious, but that motor control is unconscious 
and that, for the little that is conscious in the perception-to-action cycle, it is associated with the 
former. In short, one is trapped in the sensorium, but, even within it, one is not conscious of 
everything. Consistent with PFT, that which one is conscious of regarding eye movements 
consists of the kinds of things that are important for adaptive action selection. Seeing the world 
as unstable or the blurring of the retinal image would not serve this end. 
 
According to Ayars, D’Souza & Bremner, Keller, and Schwartz & Pournaghdali, 
PFT is too restrictive in proposing that the integrative role of consciousness is only for the 
skeletomotor output system.  (For example, Seth astutely recommends that we extend PFT to 
include effects upon the autonomic nervous system.) We believe that, first, our restriction 
renders the framework more falsifiable and fecund, and, second, the majority of the strongest 
bits of evidence corroborates it. Figuratively speaking, and in response to Lin, people tend not to 
experience conflict-related perturbations in consciousness while experiencing the McGurk, 
ventriloquist effect, or conflict in the pupillary reflex (Morsella et al. 2009a), but such is not the 
case while people perform the Stroop task or exert self-control (Baumeister & Vohs 2004; 
Preston & Wegner 2009), all of which involve skeletomotor conflict. Regarding the related, 
important insights by Keller, PFT is consistent with the notion that something represented in the 
conscious field may incidentally, because of the unconscious afference with which the content is 
necessarily coupled (e.g., the sensory inputs in the McGurk effect), be linked with effects other 
than those upon skeletomotor action. For example, in indirect cognitive control, which is 
germane to the sailing boat analogy by Hommel & Wiers, adult humans often rely on such 
effects. A process such as salivation, noted by Keller, could be controlled voluntarily only in 
such a sophisticated manner. Consistent with PFT, because conflicts involving salivation (or the 
pupillary reflex) do not involve the skeletomotor output system, one is oblivious about their 
existence.  
 
Regarding the scope of PFT, it is worth noting that, regarding the role of consciousness, 
PFT is less restrictive than Godwin et al. (2013), who propose that consciousness is tool used by 
not all sub-systems in the skeletomotor output system, but only what has been construed as the 
instrumental response system (Bindra 1974; 1978; Morsella 2005; Tolman 1948). Moreover, 
PFT does not go as far as Morsella (2005) in limiting the abilities of unconscious processes (e.g., 
in limiting the amount of unconscious “cross talk” between systems). However, PFT portrays 
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consciousness as more passive than what is proposed by Morsella (2005). 
 
R8. Clues from PFT regarding the neural correlates of consciousness 
 
Even though PFT is not about the neural mechanisms giving rise to consciousness, which is 
Marr’s implementation level of analysis, the framework provides new clues regarding the matter 
and does rule out certain possibilities (e.g., panpsychism). Hence, though PFT does not attempt 
to solve the hard problem, it does restrict potential candidate explanations.  
 
One benefit of the architecture outlined in PFT is that, for it, the puzzle of the mind-body 
problem is the same whether (a) the tokens (conscious contents) differ from each other 
qualitatively or quantitatively, (b) there is one or many tokens (the former might be more 
theoretically tractable), or (c) the field is unitary or componential. The first is important because 
we know that the brain can implement quantitative codes. For example, it has been proposed that 
consciousness depends on “precise synchronization of oscillatory neuronal responses in the high 
frequency range (beta, gamma)” (Singer 2011, p. 43). Uhlhaas et al. (2009) specify that the 
earliest signature of conscious processing is “the precise phase locking across a widely 
distributed cortical network” (p. 11). Singer (2011) adds that “brain states compatible with 
conscious processing should be characterized by a high degree of synchrony” (p. 43). Similar 
conclusions about the role of high frequencies (e.g., >30 Hz) in consciousness can be found in 
other projects (Aru & Bachmann 2009; Crick & Koch 1990; Doesburg et al. 2005; 2009; Engel 
& Singer 2001; Hameroff 2010; Jung-Beeman et al. 2004; Meador et al. 2002; 
Panagiotaropoulos et al. 2012; Uhlhass et al. 2009; Wessel et al. 2012). More generally, it has 
been proposed that, to instantiate consciousness of any kind, the mode of interaction among 
regions (interregional synchrony) is as important as the nature and loci of the regions activated 
(Buzsáki 2006; Fries 2005; Hummel & Gerloff 2005; Lewis et al. 2012; Ward 2003).  
 
There is less consensus regarding how, to instantiate the conscious field, high-frequency 
bands such as gamma (gamma in the rat, ranging from 40 Hz to 100 Hz; Adrian 1942; Kay & 
Beshel 2010) must interact with ongoing, lower-frequency bands. It appears that these 
interactions between frequency bands are complex and dynamic. In addition, controversy 
continues regarding which brain regions are primarily responsible for the high-frequency brain 
rhythms linked to consciousness and whether cortical electroencephalography reflects 
consciousness (Merker 2012).  
 
Olfaction provides a portal for understanding the neural correlates of “additions” to the 
conscious field.  (Olfaction was one of the first systems in which the nature of oscillatory activity 
in the brain was investigated [e.g., Adrian 1942].) Olfactory information may be encoded 
through oscillating neural assemblies (Adrian 1942; 1950a; 1950b; Eeckman & Freeman 1990; 
Freeman 1975; Kim et al. 2006; Laurent & Davidowitz 1994). Different odorants elicit different 
patterns across spatially distributed neural ensembles of the olfactory bulb (Freeman 1987; 
Laurent & Davidowitz 1994; Xu et al. 2000).  
 
In our creature in the cave example, the smell of smoke is an addition to the conscious 
field that influences skeletomotor responses toward other conscious contents (e.g., the percept of 
the opening). Examining the neural correlates of such an addition reveals more evidence for the 
integration consensus.6 In olfaction, it is frequencies in the beta range (~15–30 Hz in the rat; Kay 
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& Beshel 2010; Kay et al. 2009) that link olfactory processing to non-sensory, cognitive areas 
(Vanderwolf & Zibrowski 2001; Zibrowski & Vanderwolf 1997). Specifically, beta oscillations 
in the olfactory bulb “entrain” both areas of the piriform cortex, suggesting that beta oscillations 
may serve the purpose of transmitting olfactory information from the olfactory bulb to higher-
order, more cognitive areas, including cortical and subcortical areas. Accordingly, research 
outside of olfaction has found that beta may be involved in large-scale coupling for sensori-
motor integration (Freeman 2007; Siegel et al. 2012). In addition, Kay et al. (2009) propose that 
“beta oscillations are associated with motor models, favoring this oscillation as a good substrate 
for long-distance communication” (p. 7). Accordingly, beta coherence between the olfactory 
bulb and the hippocampus accompanies odor learning in a go/no-go task (Martin et al. 2007).  
(See Lathe’s treatment about olfaction and the hippocampus.) It has been proposed that, though 
the higher frequency of gamma (in the rat, 40-100 Hz; Kay & Beshel 2010) can be observed in 
processing at primary sensory areas, when the sensory information becomes part of a wider 
network that includes activations from other sensory modalities, then the frequencies are in the 
beta range (Freeman 2007).  (Mechanisms engendering gamma during odor perception reside 
within the olfactory bulb [Freeman 1979].) Based in part on such neural evidence, it has been 
hypothesized that one becomes conscious of an olfactory percept only when the representation is 
part of a wider network involving other systems (Cooney & Gazzaniga 2003), such as motor 
(Mainland & Sobel 2006) or semantic-linguistic (Herz 2003) systems. Accordingly, sensory 
research outside of olfaction has found evidence that beta may be involved in sensory gating 
(Hong et al. 2008) or in large-scale coupling for sensori-motor integration (Siegel et al. 2012).  
 
Importantly, unlike gamma oscillations, oscillations in the beta range require 
participation of (at least) the piriform cortex (Neville & Haberly 2003).  (If the lateral olfactory 
tract is disrupted, gamma oscillations in the bulb persist [Gray & Skinner 1988].) The higher the 
task demand (e.g., fine discrimination vs. simple discrimination), the higher the gamma 
amplitude will be in early perceptual processing (Beshel et al. 2007; Stopfer et al. 1997). 
Accordingly, disturbing gamma oscillations in invertebrates impairs the discrimination of similar 
odors (a high task demand) but does not impair the discrimination of dissimilar odors (a low task 
demand; Stopfer et al. 1997).  
 
Importantly, appreciation of the long-studied oscillatory properties of the olfactory 
system corroborates what has been observed in other sensory modalities (cf., Fries 2005; 
Sauseng & Klimesch 2008; Siegel et al. 2012; Singer 2011): (a) the synchronizations of high 
frequencies (e.g., gamma) in local (e.g., olfactory bulb) afferent processing (Bruns & Eckhorn 
2004; Kay & Beshel 2010; von Stein & Sarnthein 2000), especially when the process is 
challenging (e.g., fine discrimination vs. simple discrimination; Kay & Beshel 2010), and (b) the 
synchronization at a somewhat slower frequency range (e.g., beta or theta) for integration with a 
larger-scale cognitive network (Kay et al. 2009; Key & Beshel 2010). (For a review of the neural 
correlates of olfactory consciousness, see Merrick et al. [2014].)  
 
The foregoing reveals some conceptual progress regarding the neural correlates of 
consciousness. As noted by Merker, it is clear that isolating the neural correlates of olfactory 
consciousness will require further investigation.  (It should be reiterated that, for good reasons, 
some have claimed that cortical electroencephalography does not reflect conscious processing 
[Merker 2013].) Critical for the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, and for the 
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cortical-subcortical controversy, is Merker’s insight about the necessary role of the dorsal 
pulvinar in olfactory consciousness. 
 
As is evident in the commentaries, we believe that PFT will spur the field to think about 
the problem of how consciousness arises from nervous function in more theoretically driven and 




In phylogeny, there has been a trend toward the increased compartmentalization of function 
(Allman 2000). Having different brain circuits devoted to different kinds of tasks introduces the 
struggle of parts problem (Mayr 2001), which occurs when the introduction of new structures 
such as organs involves competitive interactions with extant ones. This problem may have 
increased the pressure for “many-to-one” solutions, including the conscious field. From our 
EASE perspective, although such a solution could conceivably occur without something like 
consciousness, such a possibility was not selected in evolutionary history, in which problems are 
sometimes solved by counterintuitive and suboptimal strategies (Dawkins 1982; Gould 1977; 
Mayr 2001; Roe & Simpson 1958).  (We should reiterate that intuitions regarding how 
sensations should be mapped onto responses are actually computationally impossible [Tsotsos 
1995; 2011].)  
 
The commentaries give us confidence that PFT, though based in part on established ideas 
from diverse fields of study, is a novel synthesis that advances understanding of the role of 
conscious states in nervous function. PFT attempts to redefine the nature of consciousness. One 
can propose that, if the heart can be conceptualized as a pump and the kidney as a filter, then 
consciousness could be conceptualized as a frame composed of tokens (e.g., the color blue, a 
smell, or pain) that are in a common format, a format that can be sampled only by the action 
systems of the skeletomotor output system. As an interface of sorts for the action system, the 
conscious field permits for the response to a given content to be framed by the other contents 
composing the field. The physical basis of the frame associated with consciousness is most likely 
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1. One might argue that smooth muscle actions (e.g., the pupillary reflex) are not veritable forms of action 
and hence should not be contrasted with voluntary actions, which, to the conscious actor, feel like “real 
actions.”  However, it is important to appreciate that, to an intelligent nonhuman observer (e.g., an 
imaginary, extraterrestrial ethologist), events such as the pupillary reflex would be worthy of being 
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“coded” and jotted down as actions on an observation log.  To an observer that is agnostic regarding our 
internal states, the pupillary reflex would appear as action-like as a wink, blink, or the movements of a 
finger (Skinner, 1953). 
 
2. See neural evidence for this effect in Nath and Beauchamp (2012). 
 
3. Conscious conflicts are often between a high-level system and a low-level system, but they 
may also be between (a) two low-level systems, as when one is thirsty and must drink painfully 
cold ice water (Morsella, 2005), or (b) two high-level systems, as in the incongruent condition of 
the Stroop task. 
 
4. In PFT, conscious contents can be construed as action options, or, more precisely, as 
constraining dimensions (Morsella & Bargh 2010), because that which is conscious reduces the 
space of possible skeletomotor action selection.  Unlike with the traditional (circular) definition 
of conscious representation (which is defined only in terms of being conscious), here the 
representations are defined by more than their being conscious: They are also defined by their 
ability to constrain action selection in the skeletomotor output system.  These conscious 
constraining dimensions are not involved in intersensory conflicts, intrasensory conflicts, or the 
conflicts involving non-skeletal muscle effectors (Morsella et al. 2009a).  Akin to a single 
steering wheel that is controlled by multiple agentic systems, the skeletomotor output system 
suffers from a particular kind of multi-determined guidance.  Just as simple motor acts suffer 
from the “degrees of freedom” problem, because there are countless ways to instantiate a motor 
act such as grasping a handle (Rosenbaum 2002), so does action selection, for there are many 
action options.  For action-goal selection, the challenge is met not by unconscious motor 
algorithms (as in the case of motor programming; Rosenbaum 2002), but by the involvement of 
the conscious field.  In line with this view, Goodale and Milner (2004) conclude that “the 
primary role of [conscious] perceptual representations is not in the execution of actions, but 
rather in helping the person or animal arrive at a decision to act in a particular way” (p. 48). 
 
5. Similarly, at the level of operant behavior, skeletomotor considerations are unaffected by, say, 
incentive states.  For example, the actions of navigating through a maze or drawing a candy cane 
would be carried out in roughly the same manner regardless of the nature of the reward 
contingencies (Skinner 1953). 
 
6. Supporting the integration consensus, findings in the field of anesthesiology suggest that 
anesthetic agents work on consciousness in part by halting the integration of information (Alkire 
et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2009; Mashour 2004; see related evidence in Boveroux et. al. 2010; 
Långsjö et al. 2012; Lewis et al. 2012; Schroter et al. 2012; Shrouff et al. 2011).  Regarding 
thalamic accounts of consciousness, some anesthetics can cause a reduction in thalamic blood 
flow and metabolism during the loss of consciousness, whereas other kinds of anesthetics result 
in increases in thalamic metabolism (e.g., ketamine) or decreases in metabolism while the subject 
remains conscious (e.g., during sevoflurane sedation; cf. Alkire et al. 2008).  Additionally, 
studies using electroencephalography have shown that as soon as a subject loses consciousness, 
there is a marked change in cortical electroencephalography, whereas the thalamic 
electroencephalography remains relatively the same for some minutes afterwards.  According to 
Alkire et al. (2008), this suggests that the thalamus may not be the sole location of consciousness.  
Investigations into feed-forward and feed-backward connectivity while under anesthesia suggest 
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that conscious states are associated with fronto-parietal networks (Lee et al. 2009).  (See further 
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